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Abstract
Third-party code plays a critical role in IoT applications,
which generate and analyze highly privacy-sensitive data.
Unlike traditional desktop and server settings, IoT devices
mostly run a dedicated, single application. As a result,
vulnerabilities in third-party libraries within a process
pose a much bigger threat than on traditional platforms.
We present Pyronia, a fine-grained access control sys-
tem for IoT applications written in high-level languages.
Pyronia exploits developers’ coarse-grained expectations
about how imported third-party code operates to restrict
access to files, devices, and specific network destinations,
at the granularity of individual functions. To efficiently
protect such sensitive OS resources, Pyronia combines
three techniques: system call interposition, stack inspec-
tion, and memory domains. This design avoids the need
for application refactoring, or unintuitive data flow analy-
sis, while enforcing the developer’s access policy at run
time. Our Pyronia prototype for Python runs on a custom
Linux kernel, and incurs moderate performance overhead
on unmodified Python applications.
1 Introduction
Concerns about data security in the Internet of Things
(IoT) have been mounting in the wake of private data
leaks in safety-critical technologies (e.g., [26, 27, 68])
and large-scale malware attacks exploiting vulnerable de-
vices [12, 22, 56]. These concerns have driven application
developers to deploy measures that secure data in-transit
to cloud platforms [6, 18, 42], or that detect unauthorized
code on devices [32, 49].
However, these safeguards cannot prevent vulnerable
or malicious third-party libraries within IoT applications
from leaking sensitive information. Once a developer
imports a vulnerable library, it runs with the application’s
privileges and has full access to the application’s resources
(e.g, files, devices and network interfaces). For example,
a facial recognition library with a vulnerability in the
recognize_face() function could allow an attacker to steal
the application’s private authentication token by upload
this file to an unauthorized remote server. Meanwhile, the
application developer only expected recognize_face() to
access the image file face.jpg.
This is an especially serious problem for IoT because
most devices run a single, dedicated application that has
access to all sensors on the device. In other words, third-
party code does not run with least privilege [48].
Now, these threats are not IoT-specific. A large body of
prior research has sought to restrict untrusted third-party
code in desktop, mobile, and cloud applications (e.g., [10,
11,14,19,21,24,36,41,54,55,59,65–67]). However, these
traditional compute settings face more complex security
challenges. Mobile devices, desktops, and even IoT hubs,
run multiple mutually distrusting applications; further,
desktops and cloud servers run in multi-user/multi-tenant
settings. All of these settings require isolation between
the different applications and principals.
In this paper, we examine the following question (§2):
Are traditional approaches suitable for protecting IoT
device applications against untrusted third-party code?
Given the rapid proliferation of IoT devices and the high
sensitivity of the data they handle, it is crucial to gain an
understanding of the IoT-specific security challenges that
developers face, in order to guide the design of systems
that effectively enforce least privilege in this setting.
We conduct, to the best of our knowledge, the first in-
depth analysis of third-party code usage in IoT device
applications. Specifically, we characterize the IoT library
landscape, and identify key risks to IoT applications (§3).
Informed by our findings, we propose Pyronia,1 an ac-
cess control system for untrusted third-party code in IoT
applications written in high-level languages.
In Pyronia, we retain the goal of controlling when an
application may obtain data from files and devices, and
to which remote network destinations an application may
1Pyronia being a gatekeeper for third-party libraries, is named after
the genus of butterflies known as gatekeeper butterflies.
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export data. Pyronia enforces a central policy that speci-
fies rules for directly imported library functions and the
specific OS resources they may access. For example, to
ensure that a sensitive image face.jpg is only accessible
by the recognize_face() function, the developer specifies
a read rule for the face.jpg in her policy. Pyronia then
blocks all attempts by any other library functions to ac-
cess the image file, as well as attempts by this function to
access other sensitive resources. Thus, developers need
not reason about third-party dependencies that may be un-
familar to them, and application and library source code
can remain unmodified.
To enforce such function-granular access control, Py-
ronia leverages the following three techniques.
1) System call interposition (§5.1) guarantees that ac-
cess to OS resources by all application components
can be controlled, even for native libraries integrated
via a high-level native interface such as the Java
JNI or the Python C API. However, system call in-
terposition has traditionally only been realized as
a process-level technique, and thus cannot handle
intra-process access checks.
2) Stack inspection (§5.1) allows Pyronia to identify
all library functions involved in the call chain that
led to a given system call. Thus, Pyronia leverages
the language runtime call stack to determine whether
to grant access to a requested resource based on the
full provenance of the intercepted system call.
3) Memory domains (§5.2) are isolated compartments
within a process address space, each with its own
access policy. Pyronia enforces boundaries between
compartments via replicated page tables, protecting
the language runtime call stack against tampering by
native code in the same address space.
Pyronia targets popular high-level IoT programming
languages like Java or Python [18] precisely for their abil-
ity to dynamically provide fine-grained execution context
information. We implement Pyronia on Linux for Python
(§6), although we believe our approach can be applied to
other high-level languages. Our prototype acts as a drop-
in replacement for the CPython runtime, and includes a
custom Linux kernel with support for memory domains.
Our function-granular MAC component is a kernel mod-
ule built on top of AppArmor [8].
We evaluated Pyronia’s security and performance with
three open-source IoT applications. Our security evalua-
tion (§7)shows that Pyronia mitigates reported and hypo-
thetical OS resource-based vulnerabilities. We also find
that Pyronia incurs moderate performance slowdowns,
with a maximum operating overhead of 3x, and modest
memory overheads with an average of 38.6% additional
memory usage for the entire application.
2 Prior Work
Prior research on restricting untrusted third-party code and
enforcing least privilege in traditional compute settings
has used two main approaches.
Process isolation partitions a monolithic application into
multiple processes and controls their permissions indi-
vidually (e.g., [10, 11, 21, 54, 54, 59, 64]). However, pro-
cess isolation imposes significant development and run-
time overheads. Developers may have difficulty cleanly
separating components into processes. In addition, inter-
process communication is much more expensive than
calling library functions within the same address space.
These issues indicate that the process abstraction is too
coarse-grained for the efficient isolation of intra-process
components in IoT applications. More recent work in this
area introduces OS-level abstractions to create private
memory compartments within a single process address
space [13,30,39,61]. However, these proposals lack built-
in access control for OS resources, and still require major
developer effort for deployment in high-level applications.
Thus, these approaches are insufficient to limit third-
party libraries’ access to unauthorized IoT device re-
sources. Additionally, given the rapid deployment cycles
of IoT applications, developers are unlikely to prioritize
security [3, 4, 9], and spend the time and effort necessary
to refactor their applications. Thus, one key design goal
of Pyronia is to support unmodified applications while
enforcing least privilege within a single process.
Information Flow Control attaches policy labels to in-
dividual sensitive data objects and track how they flow
through the system. IFC systems can be divided into two
broad categories. OS-level IFC (e.g., [19, 36, 66, 67])
tracks primitives like files or network sockets, while
language-level IFC systems (e.g., [14, 24, 41, 55, 65]) are
capable of controlling access to sensitive data at granular-
ities as fine as individual bytes.
Yet, much like process isolation, IFC systems introduce
a considerable amount of cost and complexity: Developers
must manually refactor their source code to specify policy
labels around specific sensitive data sources and sinks.
Additionally, propagating new labels at run time incurs
significant memory and performance overheads.
Since third-party code may contain unexpected vulner-
abilities, or a long list of dependencies, we cannot expect
IoT developers to be able to perform extensive data flow
analysis a priori to declare a data access policy that mini-
mizes data leaks. Thus, access control for IoT should not
require unintuitive policy specification.
IoT-specific Access Control. A number of recent works
in the IoT space [29, 33, 45, 50, 58] propose access con-
trol systems to enable developers and end-users to define
and enforce more suitable data access policies based on
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Table 1: Analysis of direct imports and number of depen-
dency levels in a set of 85 Python IoT applications and in
the top 50 third-party libraries imported by these applica-
tions. Unless noted otherwise, results of per-application
analyses are shown.
min median mean max
# direct imports 1 8 13 253
# direct 3p imports 0 3 6 186
# dependency levels 1 25 22 37
# lib dep levels 0 27 24 34
external factors such as usage context or risk. Pyronia, in
contrast, focuses on allowing developers to restrict third-
party code decoupling end-user application usage policy
enforcement from a developer’s implementation policy.
The FACT system [37] aims to prevent overprivileged
applications from accessing sensitive device functionali-
ties and resources by executing different IoT device func-
tions in separate Linux containers. However, FACT does
not protect these resources against untrusted third-party
code running as part of the isolated device functionali-
ties, as Pyronia would. FlowFence [21] shares the same
goals as Pyronia, but still relies on process isolation for
in-application privilege separation, and does not support
unmodified applications.
3 IoT Application Development Today
To design Pyronia, we conducted an in-depth study of 85
open-source IoT applications written in Python and their
libraries, as well as a brief analysis of reported vulnerable
Python libraries. Our analyses focus on Python as it is a
popular IoT development language [18].
3.1 Application Analysis
To better understand how third-party libraries influence
IoT application design today, we analyzed 85 open-source
IoT applications written in Python. We obtained these ap-
plications primarily from popular DIY web platforms such
as instructables.com and hackster.io; our search
focused on three broad categories of applications—visual,
audio, and environment sensing—which we believe are
representative of today’s most privacy-sensitive IoT use
cases. The four key takeaways of our analysis are:
1. The vast majority of IoT applications import third-
party libraries. All but one of our sampled applications
(98.8%) import at least one third-party library, with a
mean of about 6 direct third-party imports per application.
The maximum number of direct imports we found in a
single application was 186 (see Table 1). This demon-
strates that attacks from imported libraries within an ap-
plication’s process are much more realistic due to the
single-purpose nature of most IoT devices, as opposed to
Table 2: Characteristics of the top 50 IoT Python libraries,
including libs exhibiting multiple characteristics.
Library feature % of top 50 libs
Written in Python 12.0%
Have Native Deps 82.0%
Run external binaries 40.0%
Use ctypes 40.0%
threats across process boundaries as seen in traditional
desktop and server settings.
2. The third-party library landscape is very diverse.
Overall we found 331 distinct third-party Python libraries
among the 418 total imports in our sampled set of applica-
tions, despite heavily sampling applications targeting the
Raspberry Pi single-chip computer (a very popular devel-
opment platform for IoT). Thus, providing intra-process
access control for IoT device applications requires an
application- and library-agnostic approach.
3. Libraries rely predominantly on native code. We
find that 82% of the top 50 libraries in our analysis in-
clude a component written in C/C++, among which we
identified 68 distinct native dependencies. Additionally,
a large portion of libraries load a native shared library
via the ctypes Python foreign function interface, or ex-
ecute external native binaries (including a Python sub-
process). These results reveal how exposed applications
and the Python runtime are to threats from vulnerable or
malicious native code, and underscore the importance of
intra-process memory isolation to protect security-critical
data against tampering or leaks native code.
4. Dependencies are nested dozens of levels in IoT
applications. Finally, we analyzed the longest chain of
nested libraries for each application and top-50 library in
our sample, and find that across the 85 sampled applica-
tions, the median number of nesting levels is 25, while
the median library has 27 levels of nested dependencies
(see Table 1). These numbers indicate the complexity of
single applications and libraries, and highlight why de-
velopers need more intuitive fine-grained access control
that does not require separating each library into its own
process, or identifying the sensitive data flows within a
single application.
3.2 Library Vulnerabilities
Our survey of reported Python library vulnerabilities
covers 123 reports created between January 2012 and
March 2019 in the Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures (CVE) List [57]. We identify 78 distinct vulnerable
Python libraries, and 9 main attack classes (see Table 3)2.
2For a full list of the CVE reports included in our analysis, see
Appendix A.
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Table 3: Reported Python library vulnerabilities and number of unique libraries by attack class, from 2012-2019.
Attack class # Reports # Libs Lib/framework (# reports)
Arbitrary code execution 28 24 python-gnupg (4)
MITM 19 14 urllib* (3)
Web attack 18 12 urllib* (4)
Denial of service 17 12 Django (3)
Direct data leak 12 10 requests (3)
Weak crypto 11 10 PyCrypto (2)
Authentication bypass 9 6 python-keystoneclient (3)
Symlink attack 6 4 Pillow (2)
Replay/data spoofing 3 3 python-oauth2
We include shell injections under arbitrary code execu-
tion, and the majority of web attacks comprise cross-site
scripting and CR/LF injection attacks. We classify vulner-
abilities arising from accidental data exposure as direct
data leaks. Authentication bypass vulnerabilities arise
from system misconfiguration or credential verification
bugs. A symlink attack allows an adversary to gain access
to a resource via a specially crafted symbolic link.
While direct data leaks account for only about 10%
of the reported vulnerabilities, we emphasize that most
other attack classes, most notably arbitrary code execution,
man-in-the-middle (MITM), and authentication bypass,
lead to information leakage as well. Our analysis also
demonstrates the diversity of vulnerable libraries, with
a small number of libraries having a handful of reports
in each attack class. The two Python packages with the
most overall CVE reports are the widely used Django web
framework and urllib* HTTP library family, each with
eight reports. These findings underscore the degree to
which IoT application developers are exposed to potential
threats by importing third-party code.
In addition, we find that exploiting dynamic language
features is fairly straightforward. In our lab setting, we
built a Python module and a native library that use in-
trospection or monkey patching [53] to replace function
pointers at run time with malicious functions, to leak data
at import time, and to perform various modifications to
the contents of Python runtime’s stack frames.
While we have not identified such attacks in the wild,
our experiments demonstrate that these dynamic features
and open APIs place too much trust in third-party library
developers, and can be misused for nefarious purposes.
Thus, both dynamic language features and the capabili-
ties of native libraries pose threats to the integrity of the
application itself and the privacy of user data.
4 Threat Model and Security Goals
We aim to provide intra-process access control, which
allows developers to prevent third-party code included in
their IoT applications from leaking data. In particular, Py-
ronia protects sensitive OS resources, and restricts access
to remote network destinations.
4.1 Threat Model
We assume that IoT device vendor, who usually also de-
velop the device software, are trusted. As such, we also
trust the underlying device hardware, the operating sys-
tem, and the language runtime executing the IoT appli-
cation. Yet, imported third-party code poses a risk to de-
velopers: library code is rarely inspected or readily ac-
cessible, so bugs or dynamic language features that leak
sensitive data may go unnoticed. We do, however, assume
that application developers do not intentionally include
such vulnerable or malicious third-party code.
While data leak vulnerabilities take many forms, Pyro-
nia targets third-party code that aims to access arbitrary
sensitive files or devices, or exfiltrate sensitive data to arbi-
trary remote network destinations. Pyronia does not seek
to prevent any control flow (e.g., ROP [47]) or side chan-
nel attacks (e.g., Spectre/Meltdown [35, 38], or physical
vectors [23]). ROP defenses (e.g., [15, 16, 31, 63]) may be
used in a complementary fashion. Pyronia also does not
prevent network-based attacks such as man-in-the-middle
or denial-of-service attacks.
4.2 Security Properties
Pyronia provides three main security properties.
P1: Least privilege. A third-party library function may
only access those OS resources (i.e., files, devices, net-
work) that are necessary to provide the expected func-
tionality. Attempts by a third-party function to access
resources that are not relevant to its functionality must be
blocked. Pyronia conservatively enforces a default-deny
policy, requiring developers to explicitly grant specific
library functions access to OS resources.
P2: No confused deputies. All access control decisions
are made based on the full provenance of the access re-
quest. This prevents confused deputy attacks [28] in which
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an underprivileged library function attempts to gain ac-
cess to a protected resource via another function that does
have sufficient privileges. To detect such attempts to by-
pass access control checks, Pyronia checks all functions
involved in a request for an OS resource.
P3: Verified network destinations. A third-party li-
brary function may only transmit data to remote net-
work destinations (e.g., cloud servers or other IoT devices)
whitelisted by the developer. Thus, a third-party library
cannot leak legitimately collected data to an untrusted
remote server or device. Pyronia prevents such data exfil-
tration by intercepting all outgoing network connections.
Non-goals. While Pyronia automates access control at
the level of in-application components, our design does
not seek to provide automated execution isolation of these
components (e.g., [10, 11, 59]). We also do not guaran-
tee the correctness of the sensitive data they output. Au-
tomated code compartmentalization is complementary
to our approach, and could be added to Pyronia to al-
low developers to prevent certain cross-library function
calls. Ensuring the correctness of sensitive outputs, on
the other hand, could provide additional data leak pro-
tection. However, formally verifying the functionality of
untrusted code is beyond the scope of Pyronia, and could
be performed separately prior to application deployment.
5 System Design
Pyronia enforces intra-process least privilege without par-
titioning an application into multiple processes, or propa-
gating data flow labels.
Developers understand the purpose of imported li-
braries and can provide high-level descriptions of their
expected data access behaviors. Pyronia thus relies on
developers to specify all access rules in a single, cen-
tral policy file. At run time, Pyronia loads this file into
an application-specific access control list (ACL) that con-
tains an entry for each developer-specified library function
and its associated data access privileges. Pyronia imposes
default-deny access control semantics, meaning that a
third-party library function may only access those files,
devices, and whitelisted remote network destinations.
To enforce this policy securely, Pyronia requires sup-
port both in the language runtime and from the OS. Fig-
ure 1 provides an overview of the Pyronia system archi-
tecture, and shows the main steps involved in a resource
access request (see §5.1).
5.1 Function-granular MAC
At first glance, performing access control at library func-
tion granularity in the language runtime may seem suffi-
cient. The runtime can directly inspect its function call
stack when a specific third-party library function uses the
language’s high-level interface to access a file or device.
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Figure 1: Overview of Pyronia, which enforces function-
granular resource access policies via runtime and kernel
modifications (striped boxes). New features are repre-
sented by gray boxes. The arrows show the components
involved in an access request to a file such as a certificate.
If the a function with insufficient permissions attempts to
access a resource, the runtime can block the request and
throw an error to notify the application.
However, language runtimes also provide an interface
to native code, such as Java’s JNI or Python’s C API;
indeed, our analysis in §3.1 shows that use of this interface
in Python is very common-place. This ability to include
native code in otherwise memory-safe languages exposes
applications to vulnerabilities in native code: as this code
runs outside the purview of the language runtime, this
code could bypass any runtime-level access control via
direct system calls.
Pyronia addresses these issues via system call inter-
position (e.g., [25, 34, 44]) enhanced with function call
provenance. Many mandatory access control (MAC) sys-
tems in deployment use system call interposition (e.g.,
SELinux [51], AppArmor [8], Windows MIC [40]). Their
limitation, however, is that the security policy is only en-
forced at the process level. Pyronia achieves intra-process
policy enforcement by incorporating runtime call stack
inspection (e.g., [17, 52, 60, 62]) to obtain the full prove-
nance of the system call.
With these two techniques, Pyronia provides function-
granular MAC to enforce least privilege (P1). As we
show in Fig. 1, when the application attempts to access
a sensitive OS resource (e.g., an SSL certificate), the Py-
ronia Access Control module in the kernel intercepts the
associated system call (step 1). This kernel module then
sends a request to the language runtime via a trusted stack
inspector thread, which pauses the runtime. After collect-
ing the interpreter’s function call stack in its current state,
the stack inspector returns the stack to the kernel (step 2).
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Algorithm 1 Call stack inspection
1: procedure INSPECTSTACK(callStack, reqAccess)
2: rule← GETACLRULE(callStack. f uncName)
3: if rule== nil then return false
4: grantAccess← HASPRIVS(rule,reqAccess)
5: while grantAccess== true do
6: callStack← callStack.Next
7: rule←GETACLRULE(callStack. f uncName)
8: if rule== nil then
9: continue
10: grantAccess← HASPRIVS(rule,reqAccess)
return grantAccess
The Access Control module maintains the ACL for the
developer-supplied policy. To determine whether to grant
access to the requested OS resource, the module inspects
the call stack to verify the provenance of the system call.
Only if all developer-specified functions identified in the
call stack have sufficient privileges may the application
obtain data from the requested resource (step 3). That is,
to determine the application’s access permissions to the
requested resource, Pyronia dynamically computes the
intersection of the privileges of each function in the call
stack using algorithm 1. This algorithm prevents confused
deputies (P2), much as in [17, 20, 52].
5.2 Runtime Call Stack Protection
Untrusted native libraries reside in the runtime’s address
space, giving them unfettered access to the call stack’s
memory region. A malicious native library may tamper
with the runtime call stack in an attempt to bypass Pyro-
nia’s function-level MAC.
This challenge is not unique to Pyronia; indeed, prior
work in the mobile space [52, 62] recognized the need
to protect the Dalvik call stack against native third-party
code in the trusted host app’s address space. To address
this issue, these proposals either rely on special hardware
support [52] to separate the runtime address space from
the native library address space, or they forgo memory
protection altogether [62].
Pyronia, in contrast, aims to provide a more generally
applicable solution to this issue, since IoT software runs
on a very diverse range of hardware platforms. We over-
come this challenge with page table replication, a tech-
nique that enables us to create strongly isolated memory
regions, or memory domains, within a process’ address
space. Prior work in this space (e.g., [30, 39, 61]) has in-
troduced new primitives for intra-process execution com-
partments. Our design for Pyronia’s memory domains, on
the other hand, focuses on data isolation.
To protect the language runtime call stack for a broad
range of applications, memory domains in Pyronia meet
two requirements: (1) the size of a domain must be flexi-
ble, and (2) the access privileges must be dynamic. The
first requirement is important for ensuring that Pyronia
can support applications that make an arbitrary number
of nested function calls. The second requirement allows
Pyronia to restrict an application’s access to a memory
domain at run time based on the currently executing code
(e.g., interpreter versus third-party library), while still en-
abling data sharing between application components.
The Pyronia Memory Domain Manager in the kernel
(see Fig. 1) maintains a per-process table of domain-
protected memory pages, and replicates the corresponding
page table entries (PTEs); each replicated entry is associ-
ated with a distinct domain access policy. Policies are en-
forced at the granularity of individual native threads, and
specify the access permissions for any thread launched
under a given policy. Mapping thread contexts to a repli-
cated PTE thus allows Pyronia to transparently change
policy contexts during a context switch.
Upon a memory access, the Pyronia kernel performs all
regular memory access checks. If the requested address
is domain-protected, the Domain Manager additionally
verifies that the loaded thread context has sufficient per-
missions to access the requested memory domain based
on the thread’s policy. Any attempt by an application to
access unauthorized domain-protected memory results in
a memory fault.
To ensure the integrity of the runtime call stack, the
Pyronia runtime allocates all call stack data into a mem-
ory domain called the stack domain. Pyronia currently
defines two access policies to this domain: The runtime’s
policy, which only allows access to the call stack during
stack frame creation and deletion, and the stack inspec-
tor’s policy, which allows access to the call stack while
responding to an upcall from the Access Control module.
Pyronia loads the appropriate page table during context
switches between the main runtime thread and the stack
inspector thread automatically.
However, to enforce the runtime’s policy, Pyronia re-
quires elevated access privileges to the stack domain dur-
ing stack frame creation and deletion. Thus, the runtime
invokes the Domain Manager to temporarily adjust the
main runtime thread’s policy and corresponding PTE ac-
cess bits during these operations. Otherwise, the language
runtime still provides read access to the stack domain to
allow code to make use of shared functions, but prohibits
write access to protect this security-critical metadata.
We note that while our memory domain mechanism can
support multi-threading beyond Pyronia’s threads, Pyro-
nia currently only targets single-threaded applications. As
we describe in §9, we leave this enhancement as future re-
search due to the small fraction of IoT applications (10%
per our analysis in §3.1) that spawn multiple threads.
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5.3 Network Destination Verification
Since all IoT applications communicate with remote ser-
vices, Pyronia must ensure that authorized third-party li-
brary functions may transmit data only to whitelisted des-
tinations. That is, when an application attempts to export
data via the network, Pyronia’s Access Control module
intercepts all outward-facing socket system calls (e.g.,
bind() and connect()) for all socket types, i.e., TCP, UDP,
and raw. As with other OS resource accesses, Pyronia
then requests and inspects the runtime call stack.
However, network access privileges alone do not im-
mediately allow a third-party function to transmit data.
Pyronia also verifies the remote endpoint for the requested
socket. Thus, only if the address of the requested destina-
tion is whitelisted for the given third-party function, does
Pyronia grant access to the requested socket (P3).
5.4 Child Process Protection
We find in §3.1 that a large fraction of applications (46%)
and libraries (40%) run external binaries (including new
language runtime instances) in subprocesses. This ap-
plication characteristic poses a challenge to Pyronia’s
function-granular MAC since child processes run in an
independent context, losing important provenance infor-
mation for system calls. Pyronia addresses this issue by
ensuring the continued protection of child processes. Thus,
upon a fork() system call, the Pyronia kernel propagates
the parent’s process- and function-level ACLs, as well as
the replicated page tables, to the child process.
However, the Access Control module does not request
the current call stack from the language runtime at a
fork() for three reasons. First, the parent process may
be a native binary that is Pyronia-unaware. Second, since
application developers may be unaware of subprocesses
spawned by third-party code, using the call stack to block
external binaries may break the functionality of the over-
all application. Third, using the parent runtime’s call stack
for access control decisions in its children may also un-
duly restrict the functionality of the whole application.
Thus, Pyronia requires language runtime sub-instances to
register themselves with the Pyronia kernel to transpar-
ently enforce the developer’s function-level access policy,
and to continue managing the stack domain in the child’s
address space. In the case of a native child process, Pyro-
nia does not provide intra-process access control, but still
enforces the developer’s policy at process granularity.
6 Implementation
To demonstrate how Pyronia interacts with existing open-
source IoT applications, we implemented the Pyronia ker-
nel based on Linux Kernel version 4.8.0+, and the Pyronia
Algorithm 2 Pyronia in-kernel access control check
1: procedure CHECKACCESS(acl, reqAccess)
2: grantAccess← true
3: isDe f ault← ISDEFAULTACCESS(acl.resource)
4: if isDe f ault == true then return grantAccess
5: recvHash← RECVSTACKHASH(acl.resource)
6: hashLog← STACKHASHLOG(acl.resource)
7: if recvHash 6= null AND
8: hashLog.CONTAINS(recvHash) == true then
9: return grantAccess
10: callStack← GETSTACKFROMRUNTIME()
11: return INSPECTSTACK(callStack,reqAccess)
runtime as a modified version of Python 2.7.14. We have
released all components of our prototype on Github.3
6.1 Policy Specification
Application developers in Pyronia specify all function-
level data access rules for file system resources, and net-
work destinations in a single policy file. Table 4 details
Pyronia’s policy rule specification format. In the case of
network access rules specifically, our Pyronia prototype
allows developers to specify IP address prefixes, as the
specific address of a remote destination in a cloud service
may not be known a priori.
Nevertheless, a challenge that arises from having lim-
ited knowledge about a library’s implementation is that
it may legitimately require access to other resources that
are unexpected. For example, a library function may need
access to system fonts, or may write an intermediate re-
sult to the file system. Similarly, developers are unlikely
to have a good sense of the system libraries or other file
system locations a language runtime requires to operate
properly. Thus, Pyronia’s default-deny access control se-
mantics alone are too restrictive and may lead to a number
of false negatives.
To maintain the functionality of the application and
the language runtime, and reduce the number of false
negatives, our prototype supports a special default access
rule declaration, which grants application-wide access to
a specified resource. While default access rules bypass
Pyronia’s function-level access control, they still provide
a baseline level of security as Pyronia also applies default-
deny access control semantics at the process-level.
6.2 Pyronia Kernel
Access Control module. Our Access Control Module ex-
tends the AppArmor [8] kernel module version 2.11.0.
AppArmor interposes on all system calls enforcing a
process-level access policy. Thus, as in vanilla AppArmor,
Pyronia denies access to a requested resource if the pro-
cess does not have sufficient privileges. To add support for
3https://github.com/pyroniasys
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Table 4: Pyronia data access rule specification formats. Supported access privileges are read-only r, and read-write w.
Rule type Format
FS resource <module>.<function name> <path to resource> <access privs>
Network destination <module>.<function name> network <IP addr/prefix>
Pyronia’s stack inspection, we extend the process-level
AppArmor policy data structure with a function-level
ACL. This ACL is populated at application initializa-
tion (see §6.3), and contains an entry for each developer-
specified library function. In addition, the Access Control
module registers child processes of the main Pyronia pro-
cess, propagating the application’s function-level ACL to
all child processes.
In an early version of our prototype, Pyronia would
inspect the runtime call stack on every intercepted sys-
tem call. However, given that IoT applications are built
to continuously gather and transmit data in an infinite
loop, we improve the performance of Pyronia’s function-
level MAC (by roughly 3x) by avoiding expensive kernel-
userspace context switches for already-verified call stacks.
Thus, we implement a stack logging mechanism, which
stores and verifies the SHA256 hash for up to 16 func-
tions authorized to access a given resource, as part of the
function-level access control checks, outlined in Alg. 2.
The Access Control module first checks the defaults
ACL for the application (line 3). If the requested resource
is covered by a default rule, Pyronia grants access without
inspecting the call stack. Otherwise, the Access Control
module checks whether the the Python runtime has in-
cluded a call stack hash along with the system call (line
5, more details in §6.3). If kernel received a call stack
hash, and the received hash matches any of the hashes in
the call stack log for the requested resource (line 8), the
module grants access.
Otherwise, our prototype resorts to the full stack in-
spection mechanism (lines 9 and 10, see Alg. 1). Once the
call stack has been inspected, and if the application has
sufficient privileges to access the requested resource, the
Access Control module logs the SHA256 hash of the call-
stack in the resource’s ACL. To support this mechanism,
we made minor, backwards-compatible modifications to
the the open() and connect() system call code in order
to to parse the received call stack hash, if any, and store it
for later verification during the MAC checks.
Memory Domain manager. For Pyronia’s page table
replication, we modify the SMV [30] kernel module, a
memory isolation proposal for enforcing per-page access
control policies via thread-local page tables. Our Mem-
ory Domain manager leverages the SMV kernel API for
maintaining a list of protected 4-kB domain pages and
their corresponding access policies for the main runtime
and stack inspector threads. Upon a fork(), the kernel
copies the replicated page tables in the child process.
Netlink sockets. To enable communication between the
kernel and the runtime in userspace, Pyronia uses a
generic Netlink socket in the Domain manager, and one
in the Access Control module. Netlink sockets offer two
advantages: (1) they allow bi-directional communication
between kernelspace and userspace obviating the need
to implement additional ioctls() or system calls, and (2)
userspace applications can use the POSIX socket API for
Netlink communication.
6.3 Pyronia Python Runtime
To allow developers to run completely unmodified appli-
cations, the Pyronia runtime acts as a drop-in replacement
for Python. We integrate our Pyronia library, which pro-
vides an API for loading the developer’s access policy,
and for managing the stack memory domain.
Policy initialization. The runtime core uses our policy
parser API to read the developer’s policy file during inter-
preter initialization. All parsed OS resource and network
access rules are sent to the Access Control module in the
kernel. Loading the policy before the runtime has loaded
any third-party code has the advantage of preventing an
adversary from “front-running” the interpreter by initial-
izing the application’s in-kernel Pyronia ACL before the
legitimate developer-supplied policy can be loaded. For
this reason, the Pyronia runtime also spawns the stack
inspector thread and registers it with the kernel during the
initialization phase.
Stack domain allocation. As the userspace Pyronia
memory domain management API acts as a drop-in re-
placement for malloc, we instrumented the Python stack
frame manager to allocate new runtime call stack frames
in the stack domain. Because write access to the stack
domain is disabled by default, the runtime temporarily
obtains write access to this domain during frame creation
and deletion operations.
Child processes. Our Pyronia runtime provides continu-
ous protection for child processes spawned via standard
Python APIs (e.g., os.system()). As forking preserves the
parent process’ memory in the child, Pyronia subpro-
cesses automatically inherit the parent’s memory domain
layout as well as the Pyronia interpreter metadata, includ-
ing currently writable memory domains. Thus, Pyronia
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initialization in child processes only requires spawning
the child’s stack inspector thread, and resetting the appli-
cation’s access permissions to the stack domain disabling
write access to this domain. This reset is necessary to
ensure that the child cannot access any runtime stack
frames in its own address space that the parent process
had marked as writable at the time of forking.
Stack logging. As described in §6.2, we implement a
stack logging mechanism to reduce the overhead of ker-
nel upcalls for runtime call stack requests. When the lan-
guage runtime requests a resource for the first time, the
Pyronia performs the full stack inspection mechanism.
If the kernel grants access to the requested resource, the
Pyronia runtime logs the resource as authorized. Then, in
subsequent system calls, our prototype first checks this
log; if the requested resource has been logged, the runtime
preemptively collects its current call stack before making
the system call, computes the SHA256 hash, and embeds
this hash into the input to the upcoming syscall.
To enable this optimization, we created system call-
specific wrappers (via LD_PRELOAD) for various vari-
ants of open() and connect(). These wrappers per-
form the preemptive call stack collection, hash serializa-
tion, and authorized OS resource logging. These wrapper
functions are backwards-compatible, and do not affect
function-level policy specification.
Garbage collection. Object reference counting used for
Python’s garbage collection poses a challenge to protect-
ing the stack domain without breaking the functionality of
the application. Specifically, we found that Python incre-
ments or decrements several objects’ reference counts, in-
cluding those of stack frames, for practically every Python
instruction and internal operation.
To address this issue, we temporarily elevate the in-
terpreter’s permissions to the stack domain around those
blocks of the Python runtime code that operate on domain-
protected data. Yet, simply granting write access to the
entire stack domain is inefficient, since it may cover hun-
dreds of pages, each of whose page table entries would
need to be modified (requiring TLB flushes at high rates).
We optimize these frequent domain access adjustments
by tracking the addresses of stack domain pages in the Py-
ronia runtime, and only modifying the access privileges to
a specific page when needed. One exception to this is for
new stack frame allocations: since the runtime is creating
a new buffer with an undetermined memory address, our
prototype enables write access to all domain pages with
free memory chunks.
7 Pyronia Protection in Real Applications
To examine the effectiveness of Pyronia’s policies and
protections in real applications, we conduct three in-depth
Table 5: Summary of case study applications.
App imports Highlights
twitterPhoto tweepy integrated OAuth
alexa json data marshalling
memcache raw sockets
re regex parsing
requests HTTP API
plant_watering paho-mqtt MQTT, binary exec
ssl crypto, native deps
case studies of Python applications that specifically cap-
ture a range of common IoT use cases, and import a variety
of Python libraries. Our goal is to answer the following
questions about the usability and security of Pyronia:
§7.2 How difficult is it to write function-level access poli-
cies for Pyronia?
§7.3 What reported Python library vulnerability classes
can Pyronia mitigate?
§7.4 What effect do dynamic language features of Python
have on Pyronia’s protections?
7.1 Case Studies
We evaluate three open-source Python IoT applications
that represent the main categories of applications we stud-
ied: visual, audio, and environmental sensing. Each of
these applications communicates with a cloud service for
data processing or storage, which required that we regis-
ter an account to obtain authentication credentials. The
imported libraries in our study implement a broad range
of common IoT functionalities (see Table 5). Specifically,
our goal is to study how Pyronia operates for common IoT
authentication mechanisms, data processing techniques,
and communication protocols.
Through manual inspection of the source code of each
case study, we found four distinct direct third-party im-
ports, and three standard libraries. While small in number,
these direct imports are among top 50 third-party imports
in our analysis in §3.1.
twitterPhoto takes an image from a connected camera
every 15 minutes, and sends the picture along with a short
message to a specified Twitter account. Before sending
the tweet, the application authenticates itself to Twitter
via OAuth. The tweepy library is used both to authenticate
the app and upload the message.
alexa provides an open-source Python implementation
of an Amazon Echo smart speaker. This application
records audio via a microphone while a button is pressed,
and sends the recorded audio (along with authentication
credentials) to the Alexa Voice Service (AVS) [7] for pro-
cessing. The AVS sends an audio response, if the recorded
data is one of the commands recognized by the service,
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for the alexa application to play back. Otherwise, the
AVS responds with an empty ACK message. The python-
memcache library is used to cache the app’s AVS access
token, and the requests library for communicating with
the AVS via HTTP. This app also uses the json library
to format all messages exchanged with AVS, and the re
library to parse out any audio file contained in the AVS
response. To facilitate our security and performance tests,
we removed the button press for audio recording, and
instead open a pre-recorded audio file.
plant_watering records moisture sensor readings once
a minute, and sends them to the Amazon AWS IoT [5]
service via MQTT [2], a widely used IoT communica-
tion protocol. MQTT also handles client authentication
with the AWS IoT service via TLS. We replaced sensor
readings with a randomly generated value to facilitate
testing, and replaced the original MQTT library with one
that supports single-threaded network communications.
7.2 Specifying Function-Level Policies
To understand whether Pyronia’s policy specification
places an undue burden on developers, we analyzed the
policy specification process for our three case studies.
As we describe in §6, one challenge to specifying com-
prehensive rules for a MAC system that enforces default-
deny semantics is reducing the number of false negatives.
In running our case studies, we found that the vast major-
ity of false negatives would arise primarily due to Python’s
internal library loading and DNS resolution processes.
To examine this challenge, we ran each case study ap-
plication, in Pyronia under AppArmor in complain mode:
we identified a total of 42 common files that need to be
read-accessible, plus 4 network protocols, for the Python
interpreter to run unimpeded, and for the applications to
connect to remote network destinations.
In addition, each application required explicit access to
its parent directory as well as all imported Python mod-
ules contained within, which corresponds to up to 6 ad-
ditional access rules for the alexa application. Since we
cannot expect developers to manually specify around 50
access rules needed by their application by default, we
developed a policy generation tool that creates an access
policy template pre-populated with rules for the 46 com-
mon files and network protocols. To further ease policy
specification, our policy generation tool lists all files in
the application’s parent directory and adds rules for all
identified files. Developers may then manually inspect the
template and modify any rules that are function-specific.
The majority of the manually added access rules for
all three applications are multiple network destination
rules for the same library function. Pyronia does not cur-
rently support domain name-based access rules as this
feature requires that all domain names be resolved a priori
for Pyronia’s IP-address based network destination ver-
ification. Nonetheless, our case studies require no more
than 11 function-level network destination rules in the
plant_watering case.
7.3 Vulnerability Analysis
To understand how effective Pyronia’s protections are
against security vulnerabilities and exploits, we study Py-
ronia’s ability to mitigate specific instances of reported
Python library vulnerabilities (recall §3.2). We emphasize
that all of our analyzed vulnerabilities could affect any
IoT use case, so our choice for testing a particular vulner-
ability in a specific application does not reflect prevalence
of a vulnerability class in that IoT use case.
Since most of the reported vulnerabilities do not affect
the libraries in our case studies, we replicate all analyzed
vulnerabilities in a specially crafted adversarial library tar-
geting our case studies. We then call individual functions
in our library from our case study applications.
We place the 9 reported attack classes into three broad
categories: (1) successfully mitigated vulnerabilities, (2)
case-dependent for vulnerabilities that Pyronia may miti-
gate in some instances, and (3) beyond scope for attacks
that fall outside Pyronia’s threat model.
Direct data leaks. We analyze three distinct instances of
OS resource-based data leaks, in which code with insuffi-
cient privileges attempts to gain access to a sensitive OS
resource. To this end, we craft two adversarial functions,
which upload an SSH private key instead of the authorized
photo file using the legitimate tweepy library call, and
which upload the authorized photo to an unauthorized re-
mote server, respectively. In addition, we also replicate the
data leak bug reported in CVE-2019-9948 [1], in which
the Python urllib HTTP library exposes an unsafe API
that allows arbitrary local file opens.
We test these vulnerabilities using the twitterPhoto
app, and find that Pyronia can successfully mitigate these
problems. However, we classify direct data leaks mitiga-
tion as case-dependent because several reported data leak
vulnerabilities arise due to in-memory data exposures. In
contrast, Pyronia currently only ensures the protection of
the runtime call stack memory, but does not isolate sensi-
tive application-level in-memory data objects, or protect
against control-flow attacks.
Symlink attacks. A small number of reported vulnera-
bilities in Python libraries comprises symlink attacks, in
which an adversary attempts to access an unauthorized
file via a specially crafted symbolic link. We analyze this
attack by crafting an adversarial function that attempts
to open plant_watering’s private key through a sym-
link in the \tmp directory. Since our prototype follows all
accessed symbolic links to their source, Pyronia detects
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the attempt to access an unauthorized file successfully
mitigating this type of attack.
Arbitrary code execution. A number of reported Python
library vulnerabilities pertain to shell injection made pos-
sible due to unsanitized input. To examine this attack
class, we crafted an adversarial library function that at-
tempts to directly exec a shell command as part of the
plant_watering moisture sensor reading (i.e., random
number generator) call.
Pyronia successfully mitigates the exec as the implicit
file open is blocked. Thus, we believe that our analysis
demonstrates that Pyronia could be effective in mitigating
all instances of such shell injection attacks as they all
ultimately require access to an unauthorized executable
binary file. On the other hand, Pyronia does not mitigate
buffer overflow-based arbitrary code execution attacks.
Further research is necessary to determine if Pyronia’s
memory domains could mitigate these attacks.
Beyond scope vulnerability classes. A large portion of
reported Python library vulnerabilities are beyond the
scope of Pyronia’s protections. The majority of MITM
vulnerabilities in our CVE reports analysis stem from a
failure to verify TLS certificates. The weak crypto vulner-
abilities in our survey primarily arise because a known-
weak algorithm or random number generator was used, or
because input was not properly validated. Similarly, Pyro-
nia cannot prevent replay or data spoofing attacks as these
stem from improper input (i.e., nonce or filename) valida-
tion as well. Most of the authentication bypass bugs occur
in larger Python-based frameworks that fail to properly
implement authentication procedures.
Interestingly, the majority of the reported DoS attacks
in Python libraries stem from improper input handling or
memory management that can cause the application to
crash. While Pyronia does not verify the correctness of
application or library code, we see an avenue for using
Pyronia to prevent network-based DoS attacks.
7.4 Dynamic Language Features
Prior proposals have recognized the potential security
threat posed by dynamic language features such as reflec-
tion and native code execution [52, 59]. As we describe
in §3.2, Python’s dynamic features enabled us to replace
function pointers (aka monkey patching), leak a sensi-
tive file at import time, and modify contents of Python
stack frames including the value of function arguments.
To understand how these dynamic language features affect
Pyronia’s protections, we analyzed these three cases.
Much as in the direct data leak attack analysis, we found
that Pyronia readily prevented unauthorized file accesses
at import time. However, we met several challenges to
Pyronia’s ability to prevent all forms of stack frame tam-
pering and monkey patching. We found that Pyronia’s
stack memory domain prevents native code from directly
accessing arbitrary stack frame memory. Yet, because
Python stores the local variables for each stack frame in a
separate dictionary data structure, pointed to by the stack
frame, our implemented stack frame isolation is insuffi-
cient to prevent tampering with function arguments by
native code or monkey patching. As part of ongoing re-
search, we are exploring more robust countermeasures to
these dynamic language features.
8 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of Pyronia, we ran our three
case studies (§7.1) in vanilla Python and Pyronia Python,
measuring the execution time and memory overheads.
We also took microbenchmarks of the main Pyronia op-
erations, as well as common system calls used in IoT
applications to analyze the impact of Pyronia’s call stack
inspection-based access control.
Our testing system is an Ubuntu 18.04 LTS virtual
machine running our instrumented Pyronia Linux Ker-
nel on a single Intel Core i7-3770 CPU, with 1.95 GB
of RAM. Though not a dedicated IoT platform, our test
VM’s configuration is comparable to recent single-board
computers targeting IoT, such as the Raspberry Pi 4 [46]
or the NVIDIA Jetson Nano [43].
To ensure that the results of our evaluation are consis-
tent, we make minor modifications to our case study appli-
cations replacing their real-time data collection (e.g., read-
ing an image from a camera) with a static data source (e.g.,
an image file), and run the applications for a finite number
of iterations. We emphasize that none of these modifica-
tions affected policy specification, or were needed to add
support for Pyronia’s security mechanisms.
8.1 Execution Time Overhead
To analyze the impact of Pyronia on application execution
time, we measured 25 runs of the end-to-end execution
time for a single iteration, as well as the per-iteration ex-
ecution time over 100 iterations. The measurement for
a single iteration of the application represents the worst-
case scenario as it includes any overhead due to Pyronia
initialization (and teardown), and the kernel’s call stack
log is empty. Measuring the per-iteration execution time,
on the other hand, gives an estimate of the long-term op-
erating time of the application, and the overhead due to
Pyronia’s run-time security checks, i.e., call stack inspec-
tion and stack domain-related operations.
While Pyronia’s mean end-to-end execution time over-
head of 2-5x is significant, the mean long-term overhead
per iteration is reduced to 2-3x. Nonetheless, in absolute
terms, the worst-case execution time for a single app itera-
tion under Pyronia is 1.5 seconds for the twitterPhoto
app, which we expect would remain largely imperceptible
to end users in real-world deployments.
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Figure 3: Mean execution time for open, fopen and socket
connect system calls across all tested applications.
Figure 2 plots the mean per-iteration execution time
over 5 runs of 100 iterations of our tested applications. De-
spite the overall execution time overhead of Pyronia, we
observe that stack logging lowers the long-term overhead
of the plant_watering and twitterPhoto apps, as the
execution time mostly levels after about 5 iterations.
Nonetheless, stack logging seems to play a little role in
reducing the execution time overhead for the alexa app.
For an application that requires active user involvement,
Pyronia’s long-term overhead of 2x for the alexa app
is likely unacceptable in a real-world deployment, even
with an absolute per-iteration execution time of under
one-eighth of a second (113.3 ms).
Pyronia operation microbenchmarks. Measurements
of nine key Pyronia operations show that stack domain
dynamic permissions adjustments greatly dominate the
overall Pyronia overhead, with millions of domain access
grant/revoke calls in a single iteration in all applications.
By comparison, the median number of all stack-related
operations, i.e., stack collection and hashing, is only in
the teens. Thus, we attribute the main source of Pyronia’s
run-time overheads to stack domain access grant calls
recorded in our experiments.
Access control overhead. To further characterize the per-
formance costs due to Pyronia’s access control checks in
the kernel, we ran microbenchmarks of the libc open(),
fopen() and connect() (and their 64-bit variants), for which
we have implemented our stack logging optimization. Fig-
ure 3 shows the mean execution time over 25 runs of a
single iteration of our tested apps. Our results show that
Pyronia’s system call interposition imposes at most a 2x
overhead for the open() system call.
Summary. Pyronia’s execution time overhead is not triv-
ial, despite our performance optimizations. While some
additional time is spent during each system call, the main
slowdown occurs due to dynamic memory domain page
access adjustments. Nonetheless, because the majority
of IoT applications run on devices only passively col-
lecting and transmitting data, we expect these overheads
would go largely unnoticed by end users. We plan to in-
vestigate further performance optimizations of memory
domain access adjustments, especially for interactive IoT
applications, as part of future work.
8.2 Memory Overhead
Pyronia imposes memory overhead due to the creation
and management of the stack memory domain. To eval-
uate the impact of this domain on userspace memory
consumption, we first measure the userspace per-domain
page metadata allocations, i.e., the memory required for
the Pyronia runtime to maintain each domain page and
the associated memory management data structures for
the stack domain. 4
Our analysis shows that the mean per-domain page
metadata memory usage for all tested applications is be-
tween 0.31 and 0.38 KB; the fact that the page metadata
allocations varies this little across all tested applications
demonstrates that the majority of domain pages contain
a similar number of allocated blocks (i.e., runtime stack
frames), regardless of the total number of allocated do-
main pages. Table 6 further shows that the median mem-
ory usage of the whole Pyronia subs-system in the Python
runtime remains under 200 KB, even for applications with
over 100 stack domain pages. These results are a strong
indication that Pyronia’s domain memory consumption
scales linearly with the number of allocated domain pages.
Furthermore, Pyronia’s memory domains have a small
impact on the overall memory consumption of our tested
applications. Table 7 shows the median peak memory
usage and overhead over 5 100-iteration runs. For the
twitterPhoto application with a peak memory usage of
4We do not evaluate the actual data allocation overhead per domain
page as Pyronia does not change the amount of data the runtime allocates,
only where in the runtime’s address space this data is placed.
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Table 6: Mean Pyronia domain metadata memory usage.
# dom pages Pyronia total
twitterPhoto 176 151.2 KB
alexa 141 147.9 KB
plant_watering 54 68.4 KB
Table 7: Peak memory overhead under Pyronia.
peak usage (in MB) overhead
twitterPhoto 40.9 12.9%
alexa 33.9 33.0%
plant_watering 26.4 70.0%
about 40 MB, Pyronia’s memory overhead is only 12.9%,
even with the largest number stack domain pages.
Summary. Pyronia incurs low memory overhead, even
for IoT applications that allocate over 100 domain pages.
For instance, domain metadata only consumes a total of
151 KB for the twitterPhoto application with 176 al-
located domain pages. For applications with a greater
number of domain pages, our results indicate that the
metadata memory overhead would likely grow linearly.
While the increase to application-wide memory usage is
the highest for the plant_watering application at 70%,
a peak memory consumption of under 30 MB is still rather
modest. Therefore, Pyronia’s memory overhead would
not place an excessive burden on IoT devices with more
constrained resources than our testing system.
9 Discussion
Multi-threading. While Pyronia currently targets single-
threaded IoT applications, we discovered in §3.1 as well
as during our experiments that a small number of IoT ap-
plications and libraries (about 10%) spawn pthreads. This
programming pattern introduces one key security chal-
lenge: since threads execute independently of the main
thread. In other words, a vulnerability could still cause a
confused deputy attack (violating P2).
To address this issue, upon pthread_create() or
thread_start() calls, Pyronia could automatically save
the state of the “parent” call stack, so as to provide the
Access Control module with the full provenance when the
child thread makes a system call. Nonetheless, accurately
mapping “parent” stacks to child stacks, especially in the
scenario of nested multi-threading, would be an additional
design challenge.
Improving policy specification. As we discuss in §7.2,
Pyronia aims to reduce the burden of defining fine-grained
access policies, and lower false negatives. However, due to
our reliance on AppArmor, Pyronia currently expects path-
based access rules, which are often difficult to determine
for resources such as sensors.
Designing a more developer-friendly and rigorous
policy specification model is beyond the scope of Py-
ronia. One interesting approach may be to support
simple mobile-style resource access capabilities (e.g.,
READ_CAM), which Pyronia could then automatically map
to the corresponding low-level system resources.
More short-term improvements include adding support
for domain-based network whitelisting, and maintaining
a list of the most critical default rules within the kernel,
allowing developers to remain agnostic to the runtime
defaults. The number of required rules could be further
reduced by adding support for rule grouping. That is, for
resources accessible by multiple functions with the same
privileges, Pyronia could support allowing developers to
express these policies as a single rule.
While we believe that the risks of completely auto-
mated policy generation (e.g., as in [11,44]) outweigh the
benefits, we see an opportunity for the library developer
community to ease the policy specification process further.
For instance, library developers could contribute resource
“manifests”, i.e., a list of required files and network destina-
tions, and package these manifests along with their source
code or binaries. With support from Pyronia, application
developers could then automatically load these manifests
as part of their application-specific access policy, allowing
application developers to focus on their high-level policy.
10 Conclusion
We have presented Pyronia, an intra-process access con-
trol system for IoT device applications written in high-
level languages. Pyronia enforces function-granular MAC
of third-party code via a three-pronged approach: sys-
tem call interposition, stack inspection, and memory do-
mains. Unlike prior approaches, Pyronia runs unmodi-
fied applications, and does not require unintuitive policy
specification. We implement a Pyronia kernel and Pyro-
nia Python runtime. Our evaluation of three open-source
Python IoT applications demonstrates that Pyronia mit-
igates OS resource-based data leak vulnerabilities, and
shows that Pyronia’s performance overheads are accept-
able for the most common types of IoT applications.
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A CVE Reports for Python Libraries
Our analysis of reported Python library vulnerabilities
in §3.2 covers Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) reports made between January 2012 and March
2019. We found 123 reports for a total of 78 different
Python libraries and frameworks in this seven-year time
frame, and we identified nine main attack classes. Ta-
ble 8 shows the attack class and affected Python library
or framework for each analyzed CVE report.
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Table 8: Reported Python library vulnerabilities between Feb 2012 and June 2019.
CVE Report Vulnerability Class Affected Library/Framework
CVE-2019-9948 Direct data leak urllib*
CVE-2019-9947 Web attack urllib*
CVE-2019-9740 Web attack urllib*
CVE-2019-7537 Arbitrary code execution donfig
CVE-2019-6690 Direct data leak python-gnupg
CVE-2019-5729 MITM splunk-sdk
CVE-2019-3575 Arbitrary code execution sqla-yaml-fixtures
CVE-2019-3558 DoS Facebook Thrift
CVE-2019-2435 Direct data leak Oracle MySQL Connectors
CVE-2019-13611 Web attack python-engineio
CVE-2019-12761 Arbitrary code execution pyXDG
CVE-2019-11324 MITM urllib*
CVE-2019-11236 Web attack urllib*
CVE-2018-5773 Web attack python-markdown2
CVE-2018-20325 Arbitrary code execution definitions
CVE-2018-18074 Direct data leak requests
CVE-2018-17175 Direct data leak marshmallow
CVE-2018-10903 Direct data leak python-cryptography
CVE-2018-1000808 DoS pyopenssl
CVE-2018-1000807 DoS pyopenssl
CVE-2017-9807 Arbitrary code execution OpenWebif
CVE-2017-7235 Arbitrary code execution cloudflare-scrape
CVE-2017-3590 Authentication bypass MySQL
CVE-2017-2809 Arbitrary code execution ansible-vault
CVE-2017-2809 Arbitrary code execution tablib
CVE-2017-2592 Direct data leak python-oslo-middleware
CVE-2017-16764 Arbitrary code execution Django
CVE-2017-16763 Arbitrary code execution Confire
CVE-2017-16618 Arbitrary code execution OwlMixin
CVE-2017-16616 Arbitrary code execution PyAnyAPI
CVE-2017-16615 Arbitrary code execution MLAlchemy
CVE-2017-1002150 Web attack python-fedora
CVE-2017-1000433 Authentication bypass pysaml
CVE-2017-1000246 Weak crypto pysaml
CVE-2017-0906 Web attack recurly
CVE-2016-9910 Web attack html5lib
CVE-2016-9909 Web attack html5lib
CVE-2016-9015 MITM urllib*
CVE-2016-7036 Weak crypto python-jose
CVE-2016-5851 Web attack python-docx
CVE-2016-5699 Web attack urllib*
CVE-2016-5598 Direct data leak MySQL
CVE-2016-4972 Arbitrary code execution python-muranoclient
CVE-2016-2533 DoS PIL
CVE-2016-2166 Weak crypto Apache QPid Proton
CVE-2016-1494 Weak crypto python-rsa
CVE-2016-0772 Weak crypto smtplib
CVE-2015-7546 Authentication bypass python-keystoneclient
CVE-2015-5306 Arbitrary code execution ironic-inspector
CVE-2015-5242 Arbitrary code execution swiftonfile
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Table 8 Continued.
CVE Report Vulnerability Class Affected Library/Framework
CVE-2015-5159 DoS python-kdcproxy
CVE-2015-3220 DoS tlslite
CVE-2015-3206 DoS python-kerberos
CVE-2015-2674 MITM restkit
CVE-2015-2316 DoS Django
CVE-2015-1852 MITM python-keystoneclient
CVE-2015-1326 Arbitrary code execution python-dbusmock
CVE-2014-9365 MITM urllib*
CVE-2014-8165 Arbitrary code execution powerpc-utils-python
CVE-2014-7144 MITM python-keystoneclient
CVE-2014-4616 Direct data leak simplejson
CVE-2014-3995 Web attack Django
CVE-2014-3994 Web attack Django
CVE-2014-3598 DoS PIL
CVE-2014-3589 DoS PIL
CVE-2014-3539 Arbitrary code execution rope
CVE-2014-3146 Web attack lxml
CVE-2014-3137 Authentication bypass Bottle
CVE-2014-3007 Arbitrary code execution PIL
CVE-2014-1934 Symlink attack eyeD3
CVE-2014-1933 Symlink attack PIL
CVE-2014-1932 Symlink attack PIL
CVE-2014-1929 Arbitrary code execution python-gnupg
CVE-2014-1928 Arbitrary code execution python-gnupg
CVE-2014-1927 Arbitrary code execution python-gnupg
CVE-2014-1839 Symlink attack logilab-common
CVE-2014-1838 Symlink attack logilab-common
CVE-2014-1830 Direct data leak requests
CVE-2014-1829 Direct data leak requests
CVE-2014-1624 Symlink attack python-xdg
CVE-2014-1604 Data spoofing python-rply
CVE-2014-0472 Arbitrary code execution Django
CVE-2014-0105 Authentication bypass python-keystoneclient
CVE-2013-7459 Arbitrary code execution PyCrypto
CVE-2013-7440 MITM ssl
CVE-2013-7323 Arbitrary code execution python-gnupg
CVE-2013-6491 MITM python-qpid
CVE-2013-6444 MITM pyWBEM
CVE-2013-6418 MITM pyWBEM
CVE-2013-6396 MITM python-swiftclient
CVE-2013-4482 Authentication bypass python-paste-script
CVE-2013-4347 Weak crypto python-oauth2
CVE-2013-4346 Auth token replay attack python-oauth2
CVE-2013-4238 MITM ssl
CVE-2013-4111 MITM python-glanceclient
CVE-2013-2191 MITM python-bugzilla
CVE-2013-2132 DoS pymongo
CVE-2013-2131 DoS python-rrdtool
CVE-2013-2104 Auth token replay attack python-keystoneclient
CVE-2013-2013 Direct data leak python-keystoneclient
CVE-2013-1909 MITM Apache QPid Proton
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Table 8 Continued.
CVE Report Vulnerability Class Affected Library/Framework
CVE-2013-1665 Web attack xml
CVE-2013-1664 DoS xml
CVE-2013-1445 Weak crypto PyCrypto
CVE-2013-1068 Authentication bypass python-nova, python-cinder
CVE-2012-5825 MITM Tweepy
CVE-2012-5822 MITM zamboni
CVE-2012-5563 Authentication bypass python-keystoneclient
CVE-2012-4571 Weak crypto python-keyring
CVE-2012-4520 Web attack Django
CVE-2012-4406 Arbitrary code execution python-swiftclient
CVE-2012-3533 MITM ovirt-engine-python-sdk
CVE-2012-3458 Weak crypto Beaker
CVE-2012-3444 DoS Django
CVE-2012-3443 DoS Django
CVE-2012-2921 DoS python-feedparser
CVE-2012-2417 Weak crypto PyCrypto
CVE-2012-2374 Web attack tornado
CVE-2012-2146 Weak crypto elixir
CVE-2012-1575 Web attack Cumin
CVE-2012-1502 Arbitrary code execution PyPAM
CVE-2012-1176 DoS PyFriBidi
CVE-2012-0878 Authentication bypass python-paste-script
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